16   You shouldn't want a realism if you have a rhetoric

Deirdre N. McCloskey

Uskali Mäki and I taught a course at Erasmus in the Autumn of 1996 called "The words of science." It had a dozen or so bright undergraduates, many with philosophical backgrounds, some with economics. We started with classical rhetoric, as represented for example in Michael Billig's work on social psychology *(Arguing and Thinking* 1987), moved on to the modern rediscovery of rhetorical ideas in Austin and Searle and the like, then to the (mainly British) sociologists of science who call themselves The Sons of Thomas Kuhn. We ended with the daughters, such as Helen Longino. Rhetoricians all were these students of science, though only a few of them notice their connection to the Greek sophists and to the rhetorical tradition that ruled education in the West until the seventeenth century.

It was a wonderful experience to be trapped in a room with Uskali Mäki for several hours a week, forced to explain yourself! Uskali Mäki and I have disagreed on Realism, but it is a tribute to his attitude – which I shall argue is not Realist–that he was willing to converse. And converse. And converse. He has always been willing to converse, an open-mindedness I do not find universal among people trained in analytic philosophy. Clark Glymour amused many of his colleagues by beginning his *Theory and Evidence* (1980) with the following *jeu d'esprit*, an example of openness to ideas in analytic circles: "If it is true that there are but two kinds of people in the world – the logical positivists and the god-damned English professors – then I suppose I am a logical positivist" (Glymour 1980, ix). Most Anglo philosophers find this funny, which is a measure of how far they have strayed from the love of truth. I asked John Searle in the presence of graduate students once if he had read Hegel. John replied cockily, in defiance of the opinion of hundreds of highly intelligent people since Hegel wrote, that he had not read a page and proposed never to do so. The graduate students laughed in appreciation of this convenient advice for avoiding work. Another and more tolerant philosopher, Stanley Rosen, noted that "the typical practitioner of analytic philosophy" succumbs "to the temptation of confusing irony for a refutation of opposing

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views" (Rosen 1980, xiii). Not Uskali Mäki. It makes him a strange sort of realist.

Uskali Mäki and I tried to persuade each other all term long, with no mere irony to refute opposing views, and the students I think benefited from our genial quarreling. Teaching ought more often to be done in pairs. We teach our students in philosophy courses the style of what might be called the Rationalist Monologue (I refer to the parallel style on which the Sons and Daughters of Thomas Kuhn heap scorn, the Empiricist Monologue). "Here in a nutshell is what was said by Kant (or Austin or Mäki or McCloskey, in descending order of philosophical sophistication), but any fool can see that it's wrong, for such and such a reason; next topic!" With two views in tension this doesn't work, and the students learn to treat opponents with the respect that allows learning, as opposed to the smart-aleck conviction that we Know and they Don't – and so there's no point in reading a page of Hegel or the god-damned English professors. It's harder to treat X as a strawman suitable for demolition when he's standing there saying, "No, it's not quite as simple as that. Allow me to show you" (seizes chalk).

Our course was about philosophical rhetoric. That we gave it at all makes my first point. Philosophers should start seeing themselves – and seeing scientists, and busdrivers, and friends – as rhetors, as people engaged in sweet or not so sweet persuasion. Rhetoric gives a place to stand to see how we are persuading. It is better than thinking that there is one and only one way of making an argument, and that we already know what it is. The study of the philosophical tradition in the West suggests that How We Persuade is not fixed for all time. Plato persuaded with dialogues; modern philosophers require first-order predicate logic. In fact How We Persuade has not been fixed in philosophy for any thirty-year stretch in the history down to the present. Whether this or that argument is knock-down is always under negotiation. It's what philosophy is about, this "rhetoric."

Imagine the figures of speech stuffed into a storeroom: twelve dozen appeals to authority here, a gross of syllogisms there, 157 metaphors (few of them fresh) on the top shelf, a worn-out argument from self-refutation (evidently heavily used) close to the door, a dozen slippery-slope arguments squashed in behind the metaphors, and one argument from design, with dust accumulating on it, over by the little window. These and others are available for use. A community of persuaders such as philosophy will at one time make large use of the argument from design, say, and little use of appeals to the character of The Scientist; at another time it will use a different bundle, having put the used ones back in the storeroom. None of the items are epistemologically privileged. I am denying, in other words, that there is a timeless Good Argument for anything. To be proud that you achieve human persuasion by using self-refutation arguments and *ad personam* attacks on literary people as

against story telling and Pascal's reasons of the heart does not make much sense, considering that the bundle of figures used is not permanent. Today's user of an argument from verifiability will be tomorrow's user of an appeal to authority.

Philosophy differs from history or physics in two respects. It uses for a while a somewhat different selection than these other sciences from the common store of figures of speech. Much overlap can be expected. And it studies different objects. A science is a class of objects and a way of conversing about them, not a way of knowing Truth now and forever.

You can begin to learn about the rhetoric in philosophy from philosophers like Jeff Mason, *Philosophical Rhetoric* (1989), or Martin Warner, *Philosophical Finesse: Studies in the Art of Rational Persuasion* (1989), or on a more modest level from John Passmore, *Philosophical Reasoning* (1970), Anthony Weston, *A Rulebook for Arguments* (1992), or Mark Woodhouse, *A Preface to Philosophy* (1984). Or you can recur to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (trans. Kennedy 1991), which most analytic philosophers know they disdain (Plato told them to do so, before the letter), though few of them have read a page of it. And then you can read in the half of the Western tradition that is rhetorical as against philosophical: formal treatises by Cicero (trans. Sutton 1942), Quintilian (trans. Butler 1920), Adam Smith (yes!) (1748–1751), Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958 [1969]), Booth (1993), together with the poets and novelists and tellers of tales. Uskali Mäki is unique among analytic philosophers of my acquaintance in actually having done some of this homework. It amazes me.

My argument for such a supplement to philosophical education is the oldest educational argument in philosophy. It is that one has a rhetoric implicitly, and might as well be aware of it. Recognize the argument? When Simon Blackburn, sometime editor of *Mind*, visited the University of Iowa some years ago he gave a speech to a large audience on the old theme that one has a philosophy implicitly, and might as well be aware of it. Therefore the department of philosophy at every university should be large and all students regardless of field should be obliged to take courses in it. My philosopher colleagues at Iowa had evidently told Blackburn that down the street was this awful group of nonphilosophers gathered in the Project on Rhetoric of Inquiry ("Poroi": Greek for "river fords," or more generally "ways and means"; thus "aporia," the state of not knowing the way forward). So Blackburn made a few sneering remarks about the rhetoric of the god-damned English professors. I rose (Donald was always doing that, heatedly), and said, "Dr. Blackburn: You have used the argument that philosophy is foundational because we have to have a philosophy anyway. Do you grasp that in making such an argument you have shown that rhetoric is foundational, too, because it is the art of argument, which we must all have anyway?" Blackburn did not grasp what Donald said, and could only repeat Plato's aristocratic calumnies against rhetoric, but the Iowa philosophers

were satisfied that their local monopoly of philosophical reflection on campus had been defended from the barbarous Poroivians.

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So my first point is that philosophers would do better to grasp rhetoric. My second point is that it is really true that Realism and Truth are not Really True.

If you are properly socialized in the speech community of modern analytic philosophy you will at once leap forward toting the Philosopher's Friend, the Argument from Self-Contradiction, the rhetorical device of catching someone being committed to X at the very moment of arguing against X. Here $X =$ Truth and The Real. I just said that it is true there is not Truth. You fancy I am caught in a contradiction (if you do not notice the distinction between pragmatic small-t truth and reified Large-T Truth).

All right, let's suppose you *have* caught me. Call it the Philosopher's Tu Quoque, "you also." It is the standard and indeed the sole argument by philosophers against what they imagine "relativism" to be. Philosophers believe that the Philosopher's Tu Quoque is decisive.

(It is not, of course, because it is not valid. I mentioned small-t and Big-T. That's one rebuttal: the alleged Tu Quoque depends on an equivocation of Truth for truth. And as Richard Rorty and others have noted, "The world is out there, but descriptions of the world are not", Rorty 1989, 5, which is to say that the tu quoque argument equivocates between realism in ontology and realism in epistemology; but set these aside.)

The tu quoque is: You, oh relativist, in asserting the truth of relativism must acknowledge a standard of Truth. Gotcha. All such reasonings must confront, however, another tu quoque: that you, oh philosopher, are in turn arguing rhetorically. Gotcha yourself. Yer mudder wears combat boots. The argument is the Rhetorician's Tu Quoque. I used it on Blackburn. A philosopher is committed to rhetorical thinking at the very moment of arguing against rhetoric and advocating less reading of Hegel. It is the serious point behind Cicero's witticism in *de Oratore* (I, 11,47) that Plato was the best rhetorician when making merry of rhetoric. Bacon, Descartes, and Hobbes turned against their rhetorical educations, but of course inconsistently (cf. Amelie Rorty 1983; and France 1972, chapter 2). They used metaphor at a rhetorical level to attack metaphor at a philosophical level, and story to attack story . But I argued earlier that the levels are not distinct, that there is no meta-linguistic level of "philosophical Truth" distinct from the arguments appropriated by philosophers from the storeroom. As the rhetorician of science Henry Krips observes about Boyle's *New Experiments Physico-Mechanical* (in 1660, after decades of rhetoric against rhetoric):

On the one hand, a text cannot be rhetorical if it is to conform to the collective scientific norm which favors proper method (say, reason and evidence) and disavows rhetoric.

On the other hand, the text must be rhetorical if it is to fulfill its essential function of persuading readers who do not have at their disposal the evidence needed to justify the text's knowledge claims. (Krips 1992, 10)

I would only amend Krips' formulation by saying that reason and evidence should be construed as parts of rhetoric. Kreps is equivocating, as American rhetoricians these days often do, between Little Rhetoric (mere tricks) and Big Rhetoric (the available means of uncoerced persuasion, as Aristotle defined it, among them various appeals to reason and fact).

Bruno Latour contradicts the Philosopher's Tu Quoque as follows:

Those who accuse relativists of being self-contradictory ... can save their breath for a better occasion. I explicitly put my own account [of French science] in the same category as those accounts I have studied without asking for any privilege. This approach seems self-defeating only to those who believe that the fate of an interpretation is tied to the existence of a safe metalinguistic level. Since this belief is precisely what I deny, the reception of my argument exemplifies my point: no metalinguistic level is required to analyze, argue, explain, decide, or tell stories. Everything depends on what sort of actions I take to convince others. This reflexive position is the only one that is not self-contradictory. (Latour 1984 [1988], 266)

This nonself-contradictory position is mine, too, and Wittgenstein's, Austin's, Putnam's, Rorty's, Feyerabend's, and that of modern sociologists and rhetoricians of science. There does not exist a safe meta-linguistic level. The only noncontradictory way to deal with this unfortunate fact is to stop making arguments—such as the Philosopher's Tu Quoque, Realism, and belief in Truth — that unconsciously depend on the existence of a safe metalinguistic level.

In his *How to Do Things with Words*, for example, Austin wrote:

Suppose that we confront "France is hexagonical" with the facts, in this case, I suppose, with France, is it true or false? ... It is good enough for a general, perhaps, but not for a geographer ... "True" and "false" ... do not stand for anything simple at all, but only for a general dimension of being a right or proper thing to say ... in these circumstances, to this audience, for these purposes and with these intentions. (Austin 1975, 143,145)

In commenting on this passage the literary critic Stanley Fish makes the point here about Realism and Truth: "All assertions are ... produced and understood within the assumption of some socially conceived and understood dimension of assessment. The one thing you can never say about France is what it is really like, if by 'really' you mean France as it exists independently of any dimension of assessment whatever" (Fish 1980, 198–199). Physicists say similar things about the realest of realities. In mathematics Beltrami's proof in 1868 (a proof that Lobachevskian geometry can have no possible self-contradictions if Euclidean geometry has none) has been taken as the model of how to go about such tasks. The task is to link one discourse with another (even a discourse about Facts).

The social and persuasive character of persuasion is, after all, routinely sensible, something on which we act daily. We look naturally for social standards with which to make judgments, quantitative or not. Does your son have big feet? Well, how many fourteen-year-olds have American size thirteen shoes? Reporting "size thirteen" without some conversational context would not advance the discussion. Is "Ode on a Grecian Urn" a good poem? Well, compare and contrast it with one hundred randomly selected poems. Decisions such as these cannot be made independent of the conversations of humankind. We decide what are big feet, good poems, or satisfactory philosophical arguments. The criteria are social, not solipsistic. They are written in conversations, not in the stars.

The social character of scientific knowledge does not make it arbitrary, touchie-feelie, mob-governed, or anything else likely to bring it into disrepute. It is still, for instance, "objective," if that is a worry. In vulgar usage the objective/subjective distinction beloved of Western philosophy since Descartes means discussable/undiscussable. But even "objectivity" has a necessarily social definition: we know that the yield of corn in the Middle Ages was objectively low because we converse with people who agree with our evidence and our calculations and our standard of comparison validating the word "low." Nor are such human standards peculiar to the human sciences. The mathematician Armand Borel notes that "something becomes objective ... as soon as we are persuaded that it exists in the minds of others in the same form that it does in ours, and that we can think about it and discuss it together" (1983, 13). A scale of particle durations, star sizes, or electrical activity of the brain depends on being able to "discuss it together." The scale, to repeat, is of humans, not of God.

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Now after all this talk, which I hope is boring and obvious (because if it is for you I think you are conceding my case), I want to make a concession to Realism. We are all realists *of one kind or another.* Well, truthfully, this isn't really a concession. It's an illustration that, really, the conversation of philosophy is rhetorical all the way down. We are realists of whatever sort because we all want to be able to use the rhetorical turn, "Such and such is *really* the case, true." We want to write history, for example, *wie es eigentlich gewesen.* Since there is no known test for whether as historians we are really in touch with *das Wesen* of the battle of Gettysburg, merely whether we have this or that fact about it right, the number of facts being numberless and the only test for their relevance being the rhetoric of some human conversation, the "really" refers to our rhetoric. It refers to our persuasions about the world, not directly to the world itself.

We are all realists, then. The warrants for reality that I have in mind go this way: "*X* is really true" amounts to saying, "Our conversations about this matter usually result in saying *X*"; and that in turn, I am about to argue, amounts to saying, "In our rhetorical community one *should* at least admit *x*." The kind

of realist I am is an Ethical Realist. By this I do not mean that I am good and you, if you do not agree with me, are bad. I mean that Reality, capital-R, is not material but ethical.

Now of course we all admit, whatever our philosophical convictions, that the table is real (small-r) and that if we step heedlessly into a street near Erasmus University, for example, we are likely to get run down by either a car or a bicycle or a tram. I don't think the philosophical disagreements are really (there it is again, signaling a feature of our speech community) about the quotidian world of the Oostzeedijk in Rotterdam on a busy Monday morning. Material realists are fond of invoking the Oostzeedijk to criticize other philosophers. They say, "You would not survive for a moment out there without believing in our kind of Realism." But philosophers are not any better at navigating the Oostzeedijk or the New York Stock Exchange than other people, so it must be that their remarks about What Is are about non-practicalities. (Or else they are simply confused. I am appealing here to a sympathetic reading of them all, both Material and Ethical Realists.) If we converse on the assumption that Irrealists, who after all include many thoughtful people, are not just confused or insincere, they must have something other in mind than denying the bumpiness of trams and tables and the like. I say it's ethics, and I say it's good.

An ethical realist says that what we Know is not the Objective World. She points out that there is no way to connect ultimate epistemology with ultimate ontology – except by assumption. She therefore wants to abandon this 2,500-year-old project as, on the evidence, a bad idea, a messing with ultimates that has not worked out. The Material Realist wants to carry on, trying to imagine a bridge from a pragmatic and sensible position about small-r reality to his favored ontology, Reality. "This is Reality with the big R, reality that makes the timeless claim, reality to which defeat can't happen" (James 1907 [1949], 262). I repeat: James and I, like you, live squarely in a world of reality, small-r, a world in which Eastern Iowa is hillier than Eastern Massachusetts and in which the American Internal Revenue Service and the Drug Enforcement Agency have unconstitutional powers. What is at issue here is the philosopher's construct, Reality, a thing deeper than what is necessary for daily life. The Real may or may not exist, like Truth. I don't know, though God I reckon does. In contrast to the Material Realists, I claim only to know about the small-letter reality and truth that we humans might know.

I do know from the history of philosophy that, unfortunately, there does not seem to be any way of getting from Truth in epistemology to Reality in ontology. We all wish there was, and many thinkers since Plato have floated logs and tossed bricks into the river to build a bridge between the two. But empirically speaking the bridge looks a hopeless job. If you try to walk across the few finished pieces, you fall right in. The construction time has exceeded that of a new defense system, two-and-a-half millenennia and counting. As an empirical scientist I have to conclude that further investment in the bridge

should be given a low priority. As Richard Rorty put it, "It might, of course, have turned out otherwise. People have, oddly enough, found something interesting to say about the essence of Force and the definition of 'number.' They might have found something interesting to say about the essence of Truth. But in fact they haven't" (Rorty, 1982, xiv).

To this the Material Realists are liable to claim that their notions of Truth and Reality and a Brooklyn Bridge between the two are necessary to prevent "permissiveness" and, as they invariably put it, "anything goes." The fears about "permissiveness" and lack of discipline are surprisingly neurotic and authoritarian. As James observed, "The rationalist mind, radically taken, is of a doctrinaire and authoritative complexion: the phrase 'must be' is ever on its lips" (James 1907[1949], 259). I wonder if Material Realists can hear how much they sound like a Monty Python skit on sado-masochism when they talk about "discipline," and "permissiveness," and how things "must be." John Cleese as The Philosopher.

But, look: the Material Realist is indignant about the Sophists and James, and Rorty, and McCloskey. He is making an *ethical* claim, that it is *bad* to not be a Material Realist. *Tu quoque.*

The ethical realist takes the indignation of the philosophers seriously and concludes that what we Know is above all, indeed only, right and wrong. We cannot Know in the lofty, philosophical sense that the world exists, but we have no doubt that we *should* believe this or that about it. It's the "should" part that shows our ethical realism. The vehemence with which Realists argue, it seems to me, shows the fount of their conviction to be ethical.

I have been saying this sort of thing for a long time, but have only recently started to grasp (in Dutch *begrijp*, as against mere *verstaan*) what I was saying. Probably I am still muddled. In the first edition of my book *The Rhetoric of Economics* (1985; 2nd edn., 1998) I wrote (forgive the length of the quotation; I still believe what I said then, and it is strictly relevant):

You are more strongly persuaded that it is wrong to murder than that inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon. This is not to say that similar techniques of persuasion will be applicable to both propositions. It says merely that each within its field, and each therefore subject to the methods of honest persuasion appropriate to the field, the one achieves a greater certitude than the other. To deny the comparison is to deny that reason and the partial certitude it can bring applies to nonscientific subjects, a common but unreasonable position. There is no reason why specifically "scientific" persuasiveness (well, actually pseudoscientific: "at the .05 level the coefficient on M in a regression of prices of 30 countries over 30 years is insignificantly different from 1.0") should take over the whole of persuasiveness, leaving moral persuasiveness incomparably inferior to it. (McCloskey 1985, 45–46)

I was reflecting Wayne Booth's demonstration that to make ethics into "mere" opinion is a mistake (Booth 1974). Then I discovered that other people had

said approximately the same thing. Hilary Putnam, for example, averred that "to claim of any statement that it is true . . . is, roughly, to claim that it would be justified were epistemic conditions good enough" (Putnam 1990, vii, italics omitted). He later elaborates:

In my fantasy of myself as a metaphysical super-hero, all "facts" would dissolve into "values." That there is a chair in this room would be analyzed . . . into a set of obligations to think that there is a chair in this room if epistemic conditions are (were) "good" enough . . . What I do think, even outside my fantasies, is that fact and obligations are throroughly interdependent . . . To say that a belief is justified is to say that it is what we ought to believe; justification is a normative notion on the face of it. (Putnam 1990, 115)

Such a definition of knowing has nothing to do with "privilege" as Uskali Mäki has claimed (Mäki 1993, 33); it has to do with ethics, Ethical Realism. As Austin said, truth has to do with "being a right or proper thing to say."

Realism is a social – that is, a rhetorical, that is an ethical – necessity for the sciences. "For the presence of unforced agreement in all of them gives us everything in the way of 'objective truth' which one could possibly want: namely, intersubjective agreement" (Rorty 1987, 42). Or Stephen Toulmin: "Men demonstrate their rationality, not by ordering their concepts and beliefs in tidy formal structures, but by their preparedness to respond to novel situations with open minds" (Toulmin 1972, vii). Such a definition of "rationality" would cast the "rational reconstruction of research programs" into another and ethical light. As Rom Harre puts it, "To publish abroad a discovery couched in the rhetoric of science is to let it be known that the presumed fact can safely be used in debate, in practical projects, and so on. Knowledge claims are tacitly prefixed with a performative of trust" (Harre 1986, 90; cf. Gilbert Harman's notion that authoritative statements are ones that we accept on behalf of some group, since "learning about the world is a cooperative enterprise," Harman 1986, 51). That " 'I do not do it alone, we do it together' " in a process that never comes to a full stop, does not mean that ethical criticism need be capricious or merely 'subjective' . . . Theorists of most other disciplines are by now acknowledging similar co-dependencies of all inquiries" (Booth 1993, 385).

Then in the fall of 1997 I started to read C. S. Lewis again. As a bookish adolescent I had read *The Screwtape Letters* (1942), and much later as an adult his autobiography, *Surprised by Joy* (1956). Lewis was a professor of literature at Oxbridge, a writer of children's books, and a Christian apologist, specifically Anglican, active in the 1940s and 1950s. In *Mere Christianity* (1952, based on lectures published 1943–1945) Lewis was arguing for the existence of a Moral Law, beyond convention or evolutionary prudence, and points out that:

there is one thing, and one only, in the whole universe which we know more about than we could learn from external observation. That one thing is Man [Humanity, if you please!] . . . In this case we have, so to speak, inside information; we are in the know. And

because of that, we know that men find themselves under a moral law, which they did not make, and cannot quite forget even when they try, and which they know they ought to obey . . . Anyone studying Man from the outside as we study electricity or cabbages, not knowing our language, . . . would never get the slightest evidence that we had this moral law . . . His observations would only show what we did, and the moral law is about what we ought to do. (Lewis 1952 [1996], 35)

We do not know about Reality, the essence, the *Wesen* – the "more . . . than we could learn from external observation" – in a way that would elevate it above mere pragmatic reality, small r. But we *do* know, Lewis is arguing, the extra-behaviorist fact about our ethical selves. I think therefore I judge.

As you would expect, on the same page Lewis drew theistic conclusions from the fact of the moral law: "We want to know whether the universe simply happens to be what it is for no reason or whether there is a power behind it that makes it what it is . . . There is only one case in which we can know whether there is anything more, namely our own case. And in that one case we find there is." Eerie. But the way I am using Lewis' argument (he elaborates it on pp. 17–39; Lewis was not the originator of the argument, I believe it is found in Augustine, for example) does not depend on a belief in God. A prejudice against belief in God need not stand in the way of admitting Lewis' original observation: what we Know is ethical.

What we know together as reality is what we should agree on for practical purposes. What we Know as Reality, if we know anything at that exalted level (and the project of Material Realism as I understand it is to claim such a Knowledge), is only ethical. Ought, not Is.

Lewis himself did not deny the truths of science, and neither do I. He and I would agree, I think, that the truth of the latest quark or astrophysics is on a level with the truth of traffic on the Oostzeedijk, and does not present any special problem of epistemology. It's wonderful stuff, this science, but when philosophers start claiming it to be Reality they are making a claim beyond what the scientists themselves have to Know to do their good work. After all, many distinguished physicists (Newton, to take one example) have been theists, who speak of Knowing beyond the inverse square law. It is not the case, as Material Realists sometime claim in their hotter moods, that the Oostzeedijk and the Orion Nebula *imply* their metaphysics.

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There has always been something puzzling about the subjective/objective split beloved of Western philosophers since Descartes. It is: I cannot know your subjective experience (for example, I cannot feel your pain); and I cannot Know what is the case in the objective world, since all manner of Kantian frameworks-for-seeing intervene. Dividing up the world of discourse into subjective and objective therefore does not seem to get very far. It's dividing up a null set.

Suppose we divide the world of discourse another way, into unknowable subjectivities and objectivities on the one hand, and the Conjectivities on the other, the things we Know together. I think such a move, a late linguistic turn, would be more fruitful. It would not obviate any agreements our persuasion had arrived at about rolling balls down inclined planes or the standard of taste in literature. It would merely put these two and others in conversation, if that was thought ethically wise or useful. It would make science and religion defend themselves openly, instead of claiming Reality as their exclusive yet mutually negating realms. It would admit that we have minds and morals, that we are rhetorical creatures, sweetly persuading–like my friend Uskali Mäki, who is not *really*, you see, a Realist.

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